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The EU is facing a novel situation. After years of passiveness about the eroding
rule of law in several of its Member States (MS), the Union paved the way for a
conditionality mechanism, binding the disbursement of EU funds to rule of law
criteria. In return, Hungary and Poland, who had voted against the mechanism,
vetoed the agreement on a multi-annual budget (MFF) and, more importantly, on the
EU’s revolutionary post-Covid recovery fund Next Generation EU (NextGenEU).
NextGenEU constitutes the EU’s Achilles’ Heel as many MS are badly in need of the
recovery funding. This is why an intense debate on whether and how NextGenEU
could be decided without Poland and Hungary has erupted.  Even Ursula von der
Leyen hinted at her willingness to invoke a invoke a “reinforced cooperation”, leaving
open whether this referred to an international law or Treaty-based solution. Other
sources report that the Commission would prefer a differentiated solution within the
treaties. This week’s European Council is generally expected to see the showdown
on whether the EU will have to go ahead without Poland and Hungary.
This post looks at how the Polish and Hungarian vetoes could be circumvented
if “reinforced cooperation” was to mean “enhanced cooperation”. It could be a
solution for Member States to get most of the advantages of NextGenEU without
sacrificing a rule of law conditionality or their reinforced sense of solidarity. It might
prove necessary, however, to look into a novel and complicated approach towards
enhanced cooperation.
International Law Treaty, Covid-19 Eurozone Budget
or a “SURE”-like emergency instrument
There are several alternatives being discussed to create NextGenEU without
Hungary and Poland. An obvious first choice to go ahead without the vetoing states
would be to conclude an international law agreement setting up the recovery fund.
 Yet, the international law solution comes with a number of downsides. It has been
brought forward that borrowed funds would eventually be given out by the MS
themselves and not be borrowed by the Commission with the multi-year budget
serving as a guarantee. An arguably even bigger disadvantage, however, is the
symbolism of the vast majority of EU MS being pushed out of the EU framework
to help the members most in need. This would be a sign of surrendering the
EU framework to those unwilling to respect the rule of law (though much less
of a surrender than giving in to Hungary’s and Poland’s demands, which the
EU must resist at all costs). Surrendering the EU framework would also mean a
significant loss in democratic legitimation; while national parliaments get to vote on
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international law treaties in the context of ratification, the European Parliament (EP)
would not play a role. Even taking into account the creative possibility of the treaty
requiring EP approval as a constitutive element, like in various other occasions in
which EU institutions were used in international law settings, the EP involvement
would essentially come be a voluntary gesture by the national governments; the
requirement could be dropped inmidst negotiations, or even be excluded by a treaty
change afterwards.
A second possibility, which has been described on this blog, would be to model
the recovery fund after the formerly planned Eurozone budget, i.e. to create a fund
only for Eurozone MS. Yet, this would exclude some of the states most in need –
particularly now after the second wave of the pandemic – and some of the states in
the best position to help. That would be a devastating signal in terms of European
solidarity, especially after it has been regarded as a breakthrough that a solution was
found involving all, also the so-called “frugal” countries.
Similarly, the idea to create a fund based on Art. 122 TFEU decided by qualified
majority, following the example of the “SURE” fund, meets serious constitutional
doubts as has been described recently on this blog.
Enhanced cooperation
This leads us to a notion much-discussed in the last few days: enhanced
cooperation. This mechanism, laid down in the EU Treaties, enables MS to pass
EU law without binding all states. This can happen with two major motivations:
Either, it enables some MS to go ahead and create EU law instruments that others
simply do not want – this happened in family law or with regard to the European
Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Alternatively, enhanced cooperation can be
used to overcome a veto caused by MS who in principle agree on a measure but
not on its implementing details (see the unitary patent). Importantly, this latter,
more controversial mode of using enhanced cooperation has been green-lit by the
CJEU without any major restrictions. Technically, enhanced cooperation as such is
authorised by the Council, then regular legal acts can be passed within it. Besides
altering the setup of the Council by excluding the non-participants, the legislation
process is left untouched; therefore, full EP participation is guaranteed. However,
enhanced cooperation is governed by several requirements which must be met as
prerequisites.
Enhanced cooperations “must aim to further the objectives of the Union, protect its
interests and reinforce its integration process” (Art. 20(1) TEU) – the NextGenEU
enhanced cooperation is aimed to help MS in need. It seems obvious that this is
in the interest of the EU and the European integration. Of course a differentiated
solution reinforces integration much less than a uniform one; however, this is in
the nature of enhanced cooperation and not prohibited. In fact, it is balanced by
the requirement of the cooperation to be “open at any time to all Member States”
(Art. 20(1) TEU; Art. 328 TFEU). This could turn out to be problematic; what if MS
decide to go ahead and create NextGenEU by way of enhanced cooperation and
the blocking states simply join it and receive funds while still blocking the MFF?
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Such a scenario could be prevented: Art. 328(1) TFEU foresees a possibility to
make joining an enhanced cooperation dependent on conditions. As long as these
conditions are objective and have a genuine link to the enhanced cooperation in
question, they may concern a variety of requirements, thus even serving as a way
to introduce conditionality to enhanced cooperation. Thus, the participating states
could make participation depend on rule of law-related criteria, such as not being
subject to an Art. 7-procedure, or joining the EPPO to ensure a sound handling of
the funds. On the positive side, if non-participants agreed to join the cooperation
under these conditions, the enhanced cooperation could eventually turn into regular
EU law without major difficulties.
Furthermore, enhanced cooperation must be adopted as a “last resort”
(Art. 20(2) TEU). Whether this requirement is met depends on the upcoming
negotiations, but two fruitless European Council meetings seem like a strong
indicator that a solution cannot be found. What is important is that the acts to be
passed within the differentiated framework do not need to be identical with the one
that failed to reach the necessary Council majority. Thus, the fact that the EU cannot
find a compromise on a new Own Resource Decision (ORD) which would serve as a
basis for NextGenEU does not mean that the resulting enhanced cooperation could
only produce a differentiated ORD. It is rather the political project at large that needs
to be taken into consideration.
Most of the remaining requirements concern the internal market, competition, or
trade, all of which are not at stake here. However, Art. 327 TFEU lays down that
any enhanced cooperation “shall respect the competences, rights and obligations
of those Member States which do not participate in it”. In this respect, it is crucial to
bear in mind that NextGenEU is not foreseen to cause any budget cuts etc. – it is
money for MS on top of the budget. None of the states have a right to it, as it is a
sign of solidarity among MS. Thus, non-participants’ rights and competences would
not be affected.
However, the most important factor in order to understand what a differentiated
NextGenEU would look like is the scope of application of enhanced cooperation. The
Treaties only state that the mechanism “can only be established within the Unions
non-exclusive competences” (Art. 20(1) TEU). The question, thus, is which legal
basis the post-Covid-19-recovery cooperation would be based on.
MEP Sven Giegold and EU law professor Rene Repasi in their recent proposal
(similar proposal here) suggested to move specifically the vetoed ORD based on
Art. 311(3) TFEU to the enhanced cooperation framework. This would effectively
create a parallel budget involving only participating MS. This second budget would
be used to implement NextGenEU as planned. Such a structure would of course be
complicated, but not totally unthinkable. The problem that I see with this, however,
is the nature of Art. 311(3) TFEU. Many voices, i.a. the Bundesverfassungsgericht,
consider Art. 311(3) TFEU to be a specific treaty amendment procedure. Even if
this is not explicitly mentioned as excluding an enhanced cooperation, can we really
imagine primary law amendments based on enhanced cooperation? Even if one
disagrees and considers the ORD a mere secondary law act, building a NextGenEU-
enhanced cooperation on it would entail considerable risks, given that the CJEU
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could agree with the former finding or disagree but trigger another clash with national
constitutional courts.
The alternative would be to not include the ORD, but the principal aim, namely the
creation of NextGenEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) in the enhanced
cooperation. Thus, the fund would be created directly by the smaller group of MS.
This would lead to the question where the funding for it would come from. In general,
Art. 332 TFEU foresees that expenditure arising from an enhanced cooperation is
borne by the participating states. This would mean that the crisis-hit MS suffering
from high debt burdens would have to raise even more money in order to effectively
give it to themselves – hardly a solution as effective as NextGenEU, the beauty of
which was that the money was supposed to be borrowed by the EU. Of course, as
Martin Nettesheim has pointed out, MS could agree on a joint liability for the funds
borrowed – that, however, would lead us back to the discussion on Eurobonds,
an instrument which MS have shied away from even in the most difficult of crisis
moments.
Which way to go
In conclusion, two solutions are in a legal grey area (enhanced cooperation based on
Art. 311 TFEU; QMV-decision based on Art. 122 TFEU), an another one would be a
leap backwards in terms of solidarity (Covid-Eurozone-Budget). An international law
solution has symbolic problems and lacks democratic legitimation. Creating the RFF
by enhanced cooperation solves the latter problems but can only be pursued if MS
agree to Eurobonds, which realistically they won’t.
Perhaps in this situation, the best solution is in a mixture of these approaches. A
fund created by way of enhanced cooperation would be fully legitimated by the
EP and send a strong signal to the vetoing states. To fund it, the participating MS
could resort to international law. It has been done before when Eurobonds where
to be avoided that MS created international law facilities, endowed them with large
financial guarantees and let them borrow money on the financial markets to disburse
it to MS – the EFSF and ESM work(ed) along these lines. Art. 332 TFEU merely
states that MS need to cover the expenses arising from an enhanced cooperation.
The question how this is done is fully in the responsibility of the MS. Whether they
pay their shares individually or channel them before, whether they are borrowed
or not is a question of the “back end” of the financing that is of no interest from
the perspective of the Treaties. In addition, as explained above, an enhanced
cooperation can cover a whole policy field and is not limited by the initial proposal
that failed to be adopted by the EU as a whole. Given this, one could even consider
that future sources of revenue could be passed in the enhanced cooperation
framework, explicitly to cover the expenses of the fund.
This solution would not, by any means, be an easy one. In fact, two different
governance layers, an enhanced cooperation and an international law treaty,
would also mean two drafting processes, adoption on the level of the EU and
ratification in all participating MS. Yet, it could be a solution for MS to push most of
the advantages of NextGenEU across the finishing line without sacrificing their newly
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won firm stance on the rule of law or their reinforced sense of solidarity. This might
be enough of a motivation to look into a novel and admittedly complicated approach
for NextGenEU to go ahead.
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